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The wider context: some key implications of 
generational change in Asia 
Eugene Sebastian 
Introduction 
Asia is undergoing a tremendous change impelled by the rise of 
a new political and economic leadership, and the emergence of 
new social formations. After independence and during the  
Cold War, leaders of countries in the Asia Pacific region 
emerged from the ranks of military, bureaucratic and political 
elites. During this era of relative stability and fast paced 
economic development, at least two factors were certain: the 
views of the leadership and their political inclination. In the 
next few years this is set to change. A new generation (35–50 
years old) is now coming into positions of political, economic 
and military influence and leadership. Within the region’s social 
dynamics, rapid transformation driven by the growing influence 
of the 20- and 30-year-olds is beginning to exert political and 
economic influence over their country’s development. They’re 
young, cosmopolitan, mostly Western educated, globalised in 
their thinking and high spenders. Asia’s generational transition 
and social transformation raises new questions about how the 
region will develop in the next five to 10 years and its 
implications for Australia. For Australia it will be increasingly 
important to track, understand and act on these changes as we 
continue to identify more strongly with the region.  
As a conclusion to this book this chapter will widen the 
perspective beyond two key nations and explore some of the 
changes taking place in Asia as the geographical and social 
context that brings Australia and Korea together. This chapter 
will focus on the social and political aspects of generational 
change in Asia, particularly on the emergence of new leadership 
and the inextricably intertwined changing social formations that 
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have emerged. There are some clear messages that can be taken 
from the work of the researchers from Australia and Korea 
whose work has been presented in the previous chapters. These 
messages relate primarily to challenges of generational change 
within the countries and some of the key social issues that have 
emerged, challenging both their governments and broader 
societies. The way these changes are addressed will rely on the 
stability and capacities of leaders in government throughout the 
Asian region, thus highlighting the importance of how the 
region more broadly is affected by generational change. The 
issues of generational change affecting the governance and 
political direction of the region are the same generational issues 
discussed in the previous chapters – the digital generation, the 
sandwich generation and the ageing population are making 
demands on leadership and government and are crucial issues 
for political and economic stability in the region. 
Leadership in transition 
In Korea, the 2002 election of outsider, President Roh Moo-
hyun, marked the completion of Kim Dae Jung's presidency and 
the end of a political generation. Roh represented the first post-
war generation politician to head the nation. He symbolised 
liberals, favouring economic equality and a more autonomous 
foreign policy, while his rival, Lee Hoi-chang, stood for the 
ruling political elites who tended to be traditional and 
conservatives in their thinking. Roh’s rise, on the one hand was 
viewed as a victory of reform, post-cold war sentiment and anti-
regionalism (Hoon Juang, 2003). Others attribute the victory 
also to the use of the Internet as a powerful media in mobilising 
a younger generation in support.  
At the core of this generational shift in Korean politics is the 
emergence of what is dubbed the ‘386’ generation. About 20 of 
President Roh’s top advisers are 386ers. (Lee, 2006) The 
number three represents those in their late 30s; young and 
hungry for power and influence. The number eight represents 
the 1980s when they attended University during a tumultuous 
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period in Korean history, the shift from dictatorship to 
democracy, and the number six represents the 1960s, when they 
were born during the era of rapid Korean industrialisation. They 
are highly educated, digitally adept, entrepreneurial and form 
the backbone and the policy force in Rho's administration. The 
386 generation is more conspicuously cautious about embracing 
the dictates of the United States, especially in relation to their 
belligerent northern neighbour, North Korea. They are 
idealistically determined to root out corruption and are seeking 
to develop closer relations with China and Japan (Sunhyuk & 
Wonhyuk, 2007).  
In China, the ‘fourth generation’ of leaders has formally 
assumed power. The first generation of leaders was represented 
by Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, leaders that started the 
People’s Republic of China. A common characteristic of the  
first generation leaders is that they tended to be both political 
and military leaders, educated in China and involved in the 
Long March, Chinese Civil War and the Second Sino-Japanese 
War. The second generation was represented by leaders  
involved in the Chinese revolution but in junior roles such as 
Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yu, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. Unlike 
the first generation many of the second generation were 
educated overseas. The third generation however were leaders 
born before the revolution, educated overseas, mostly in the 
Soviet Union, and were either political or military leaders. The 
third generation included Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, Zhu Rongji and 
Liu Ruihuan.  
The current crop of leaders, known as the ‘fourth generation’ or 
the ‘republican generation’ are aged in their late 50s and  
early 60s, are much younger than their elders who assumed 
leadership positions in their late 60s and early 70s. The 
republican generation includes current president, Hu Jintao, 
Wen Jiabao, Zeng Qinhong and Wu Bangguo. Cheng Li suggests 
that collectively the fourth generation of leaders is less dogmatic, 
more capable and more diversified (2001:17). The majority of 
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the leaders grew up during the Cultural Revolution, many 
acquiring their first political experience during the revolution.  
They grew up in a political environment characterised 
by idealism, collectivism, moralism and radicalism. 
They were taught to sacrifice themselves for socialism. 
But as time passed, their faith was eroded and their 
dreams shattered (2001: 18). 
The fourth generation leaders, suggests Cheng Li, are more 
diversified than previous generations in terms of political 
solidarity and occupational backgrounds. Cheng Li’s study of 
522 high-ranking leaders in the fourth generation shows that 
about half of them joined the Party during the decade of the 
Cultural Revolution. Another 35 per cent joined the Party 
before, and 15 per cent joined after the Cultural Revolution. 
(There is roughly a 15-year span between the oldest and 
youngest members of the fourth generation.) Unlike the 
previous generation that shared strong bonding experiences 
such as the Long March and the Anti-Japanese War, the fourth 
generation of leaders lack political solidarity and a willingness to 
commit to the existing political system (2001: 18). 
This new power cohort has shed its ideological baggage, is better 
educated than its predecessors and more supportive of 
economic and political reform. While in previous years the most 
important posts in China’s financial system were usually 
occupied by Soviet-trained engineers, today’s leaders are 
technocrats. There are more financial experts and lawyers in the 
fourth generation than in previous generations. At their heels 
are the ‘fifth generation’, in their 30s to 40s. Educated in elite 
universities in the European Union and the United States, they 
are reputedly liberal in their outlook and are already attaining 
ministerial status. 
In Japan, in September 2006, 51-year-old Shinzo Abe was elected 
by a special session of Japan’s National Diet to replace retiring 
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. In a country where power is 
based on seniority and rank, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is 
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Japan’s youngest post-World War II prime minister and the first 
born after the war. His ascension to power is owed largely to 
three factors: his family pedigree: his father served as foreign 
minister in the 1980s and his grandfather was prime minister in 
the 1950s; his hawkish position on Japan foreign policy, 
particularly his nationalist stance on North Korea and Japan’s 
broader military activism in East Asia; and his youthful appeal 
and energy needed to reignite Japan’s reform.  
Under Prime Minister Abe, Japan is becoming more ‘muscular 
in its rhetoric and posture’. Under this rising regional assertive 
tendency is a new generation of political leadership. A new 
political generation called the Heisei generation is now on the 
road to political ascension. Heisei is used to describe the current 
era name in Japan. The Heisei, which refers to seeking peace at 
home and abroad, emerged at the end of the Cold War in 1989 
and after the death of Emperor Hirohito the same year. His 
successor, Emperor Akihito chose the name ‘Heisei’ to 
symbolise his reign. Under the Heisei era, a new generation of 
leaders emerged, who strongly supported Koizumi’s reform. 
Kenneth Pyle observes Koizumi’s unusual decision to make his 
cabinet appointments irrespective of factional politics and to 
reach policy decisions more independent of the LDP party 
council reflected the predilection of younger party members 
(Pyle, 2006: 26). Young Japanese coming to maturity in the 
Heisei years, adds Pyle (2006), are experiencing the kind of 
decisive change that gives rise to a new political generation. 
The rest of Asia is not far behind this type of generational 
change in political leadership. In the past couple of years, 
Singapore has allocated key cabinet posts such as finance, 
defence and information technology to younger ministerial 
candidates. The prime ministerial succession is already in place 
for 2007. In Indonesia, the ‘cowboys’ that brought down 
Abdurrahman Wahid are moving into key political positions. 
These young and affluent players claim to hate corruption and 
are seen by many as the ‘new hope’ for dismantling the Suharto-
era structures. 
211 
The young leaders of Asia share a range of 
characteristics regardless of their political affiliation. 
They grew up in a peaceful and prosperous region and 
have no living memory of the Second World War and 
its aftermath. Ito Joichi, a young Internet entrepreneur 
and venture capitalist, born in 1966, wrote in 2005 on 
the 60th anniversary of the atomic bombings: The 
bombings don’t really matter to me, or, for that 
matter, to most Japanese of my generation. My peers 
and I have little hatred or blame in our hearts for the 
Americans...My grandparents’ generation remembers 
the suffering, but tries to forget it. My parents’ 
generation still does not trust the military. The pacifist 
stance of that generation comes in great part from the 
mistrust of the Japanese military...For my generation, 
the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings and the war in 
general now represent the equivalent of a cultural 
‘game over’ or ‘reset’ button. Through a combination 
of conscious policy and unconscious culture, the 
painful memories and images of the war have lost their 
context, surfacing only as twisted echoes in our 
subculture. The result, for better and worse, is that 60 
years after Hiroshima, we dwell more on the future 
than the past (as cited in Pyle, 2006: 29). 
They’re mostly western educated, appeal to a young 
constituency, and are more assertive and less dedicated to the 
status quo. They are more concerned about the future and pay 
less attention to the past. They appear to be increasingly 
nationalistic but are in fact more assertive about their nation’s 
self identity and the need to pursue its own interest even if it 
means dissenting from greater global powers. 
Asia’s next generation of leaders will face four defining policy 
challenges. They need to respond to social forces unleashed by 
the economic reforms of the past decade; creatively 
accommodate and cope with an acutely organised, complex and 
robust society; innovatively respond to the dilemmas of the new 
economy driven by technology and communications; address the 
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needs of changing demographics, particularly the ageing of 
their populations and; navigate the challenges of global 
‘terrorism’ and global economic volatility. 
Social and political transformation 
When discussing issues around generational changes in Asia, 
three themes seem to emerge: the contrast between 
traditionalism and modernisation stemming from the increasing 
global awareness of the younger generation and the consequent 
widening gap between the younger and older generations; the 
transformation in value systems and political attitudes; and a 
shift in consumption and the increasing influence of new 
technologies (Song, 2003; Beech, 2004; Marshall, 2003;  
Nhu-Ngoc Ong, 2004: 1–4; Fahey, 2003: 82–5). 
Tradition and modernity 
Generational change across Asia has brought about a situation 
of contrast and confrontation between tradition and modernity. 
As younger generations move into positions of social, political 
and economic significance, a major issue they face is the  
role tradition has in an increasingly modern Asia (Fahey, 2003: 
82–5; Nhu-Ngoc Ong, 2004:1; Song, 2003). Many Asian youth 
are becoming disillusioned with the older generations’ inability 
to solve social problems and the inherent cronyism and 
corruption within governments. Such disillusionment widens the 
gap between the young and the old leading to social and 
political repercussions. 
As mentioned above, what is interesting about Roh’s propulsion 
to Korea’s highest office is that it was driven in large part by the 
mobilisation of a younger generation. Young voters between the 
ages of 20-39 came to account for more than half of the whole 
electorate for the first time in South Korean history. This age 
group outnumbered Roh’s opponent by more then 20 per cent 
and occupied almost half (48 per cent) of the entire vote, 
helping Roh secure a victory by 2.3 per cent of the vote. This so- 
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called ‘20/30 generation’, suggests Hoon Juang (2003), 
constituted the majority of ‘red devils’ who frenziedly rooted for 
their team during its 2002 World Cup victories. Half a million 
‘red devils’ filled the squares in front of the Seoul City Hall and 
Gwangwhamoon every time the home team took the field. When 
a United States military court delivered a not guilty verdict to US 
soldiers who were driving vehicles that killed two Korean 
schoolgirls, the 20/30 generation spearheaded nationwide anti-
American protests that have continued since November 2002. 
“Soccer fans and anti-American protesters both represent the 
national pride, self-determination, and self-expression of a new 
generation” (Hoon Jaung, 2003: 4). 
The election of a political outsider in Korea seems to reflect a 
revolt against tradition and the elite political establishment. The 
preference for leadership change is driven, in part, by two 
important variables: the aspiration of the younger generation 
determined to escape from old customs and old fashioned habits 
in an era of fast pace economic growth; and the discontentment 
with the older generation’s perceived ‘passive and conservative 
actions’ in dealing with social problems. In his observation of the 
Korean election, Ho Keun Song (2003) suggested that the youth 
push for Roh was merely to remove tradition and the 
‘gentlemen’s club’ in ‘revolt against achievement and legacy of 
the old generation’. The tendency was instead to mobilise and 
promote what he refers to as the ‘commoner-oriented sentiment 
in politics and society’, a sentiment that emphasises human 
rights, equality and justice.  
A similar changing attitude is occurring within the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) as a result of generational change. 
Freeman (2003) for example, argues that while major policy 
departures are unlikely, ‘incremental, orderly change’ has 
begun to take place in the hope of improving the government’s 
ability to handle social issues. Freeman (2003) discussed the 
SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) crisis as an example 
of the government’s failure to handle an emergency due to its 
reversion to traditional ways of controlling information. During 
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the crisis, the Chinese government attempted to cover up the 
severity of the situation announcing that the number of cases 
was 1500 with only 67 fatalities. However, China’s health ministry 
later reported that the nationwide death toll from SARS stood at 
79, with 1807 confirmed cases (Gittings, 2003). The younger 
generation are realising the need to adopt more modern 
processes within government and in relation to the control and 
diffusion of information. 
Western colonialism and numerous civil wars throughout the 
region have had a tremendous impact on Asian politics and 
social institutions. The process of modernisation has been 
particularly fast paced, leaving people in the region very little 
time to adjust (Nhu-Ngoc Ong, 2004:1). Despite the absence of 
wars and conflicts, Asia’s younger generation has experienced 
transitions from a ‘traditional society to a post-industrial society 
in a single generation’ (Fahey, 2003: 82). “Unprecedented 
economic and technological change throughout Asia has  
made it difficult for Asian culture and politics to ‘keep up’, this 
having a deep impact on younger generations who are 
attempting to forge a sense of national and person identity” 
(2003: 82). As such, the question of tradition versus 
modernisation is particularly significant to the phenomenon of 
generational change. 
Song (2003:5) has attempted to address the compatibility of 
tradition and modernity in his observations of the election of 
President Roh. He argues that what is occurring in Korea is a 
situation of ‘cultural strife’, a ‘generational mission against the 
legacy of high-speed growth’ through which the younger 
generation is trying to construct a form of ‘symbolic power’ for 
their generation. He argues that fast-paced change implemented 
by his generation has resulted in a younger generation that are 
directly opposed to fast paced change and all things associated 
with it (including ‘traditional’ processes of government) (Song, 
2003:19). He states that:  
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The main purpose of cultural strife is to overthrow all 
inheritance from authoritarian, cold war, and growth-
first ideology as shackle of free imagination and 
uncurbed exploration to future utilizing information 
technology (Song, 2003:8).  
Thus, while Song (2003:10–12) describes ‘cultural strife’ as a 
form of rebellion against the older generation, he also provides 
numerous points that legitimise the younger generation’s 
changing attitudes to tradition and modernisation.  
Song’s analysis is useful as it highlights one reaction to 
generational change from within Asia, thus providing insight 
into how generational change in politics is having an impact on 
the region.  
At another level, Hutzler (2002) discusses the influence of 
globalisation and Westernisation on generational change in 
China, posing the question of the extent to which traditional 
Chinese institutions and values are compatible with Western 
values and institutions. Hutzler suggests that a prominent issue 
facing the new generation of leaders in China will be how they 
handle dealing with the West, and govern ‘China’s increasingly 
complex and close relationship with the rest of the world’. 
Similarly, some observers look at the possibility of a ‘hybrid’ 
solution as younger generations become more globally aware –
the notion that Asian youth wish to remain ‘a little bit East, a 
little bit West’ when looking at issues of society and politics (Hill, 
2003; Nhu-Ngoc Ong, 2004: 1). 
What indeed seems to be the consensus is that generational 
change in Asia is resulting in the development of a younger 
generation that is much more globally aware, and much more 
sensitive to the possibility of merging modern Western ways of 
doing things with more traditional customs and institutions. 
However, there are many questions surrounding the 
implications of tradition and modernity and the widening 
distance between generations for the phenomenon of 
generational change in Asia. ‘Will the next generation lead their 
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countries toward political pluralism or increased nationalism? 
Will growing anti-Americanism among the young in Korea and 
Japan give rise to a more politically powerful China globally? 
How will young peoples’ dissatisfaction with authoritarian 
governments as well as corrupt political parties in the new 
democracies play out?’ Generational change (particularly in 
terms of the relationship between tradition and modernity) as it 
affects international economic and security architecture, is so 
significant that it is relevant to ask what impact this will have on 
Australia. Will it be easier to do business if Asia is more open to 
Western economic structures? As it is still uncertain how the 
changing role of tradition and modernity within Asia will affect 
Australia, this area requires further research. 
Transformations in value systems and political attitudes 
Fewsmith (2002) suggests that generational succession is always 
important, because different generations have different 
formative experiences, different expectations about the world, 
and different types of training on which to draw when dealing 
with problems. Generational change in Asia is characterised by a 
significant alteration of value systems that are reflected in the 
political attitudes of the younger generation. The process of 
democratisation and globalisation taking place throughout the 
region are having a vast impact on how the younger generation 
view themselves. Asian youth are becoming more aware of Asia’s 
growing relationship with the rest of the world. An increasingly 
high percentage of the younger generation are benefiting from 
the opportunity of studying overseas in Western institutions. 
They are becoming more open-minded and adaptive, post-
material, increasingly individualistic and much more concerned 
with issues of social welfare (Marshall, 2003; Nhu-Ngoc Ong, 
2004: 1). In Japan for example, the transforming value system is 
represented by young people who are less driven by the all-
consuming work ethic characteristic of their parents’ fears of 
poverty. They are much more concerned with personal 
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fulfilment and share distaste for hierarchy and convention in the 
workplace (Marshall, 2003). 
Recent discussions on generational change in the region 
examined the development of post-materialism, focusing on the 
situation of ‘cultural strife’ in South Korea. Song (2003:10–12) 
for example, describes rapid economic development and social 
differentiation as major contributing factors to changing value 
systems, as political freedom and market competition have 
become central to the younger generation. Song (2003:11) 
highlights the desire to shift from ‘hard politics’ to ‘soft politics’, 
as the younger generation is increasingly concerned with issues 
of human rights, peace, gender equality, and environmental 
protection. The election of President Roh is symbolic of this 
change in values, reflecting the shift of policy weight to 
distribution and social welfare for lower classes: 
It is apparent that the Roh government’s utmost goal is 
to promote social integration and remedy social 
displacement by improving distributive justice and 
fulfilling essential aspects of post-material values 
(Song, 2003:15). 
Fahey (2003) also discusses the influence of changing value 
systems on political attitudes, describing the younger 
generation’s political agenda as being concerned with 
challenges to obligation and patriarchy within the family and 
workplace; engagement with and responses to globalisation; and 
tendencies towards nationalism, anti-Americanism and 
democracy (Fahey, 2003: 85). 
A study conducted by The Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies in 2002 on the implications for the United States of 
generational change in Japan provides a very detailed 
investigation of the phenomenon of generational change. 
According to the study, young leaders in Japan share common 
characteristics regardless of their political affiliation: they grew 
up in a relatively peaceful and prosperous period, having no 
living memory of the Second World War or its aftermath. They 
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are arguably more assertive and less committed to the status quo. 
They are more concerned with the future and less concerned 
with the past. They are increasingly nationalistic, attempting to 
forge a Japanese identity and greater international role. They 
are, however, unable to clearly articulate Japanese national 
interests and goals, or provide a clear blueprint for political and 
economic reform. In contrast to previous generations, they do 
not feel burdened by Japanese history, believing instead that 
Japan should come to terms with its past and move forward (The 
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2002: 3). 
According to Fahey, the Post-Tiananmen square generation in 
China has become more nationalistic, expressing dissatisfaction 
with their government for not protecting them against 
international humiliation (2003: 92). Post World War II tensions 
still exist within China in younger generations, however they are 
manifested differently than in previous generations (Fahey, 
2003: 84; Sutter, 2002). According to Sutter, current negativity in 
the Sino-Japanese relationship has developed due to ‘strong and 
often growing areas of mutual interest’ (Sutter, 2002). Relative 
weakening of Japanese economic performance and political 
leadership has ‘coincided’ with an increase in Chinese power 
and influence in Asian affairs. Within China, these tensions have 
evolved from Chinese leaders’ focus on Japan as having 
victimised China in the past, thus linking it to the recent 
promotion of nationalism within China (Sutter, 2002). 
Another issue related to changing value systems stems from the 
increasing role of international education. According to current 
literature, a common experience shared by the younger 
generation across Asia is that of overseas education in Western 
institutions (Fahey, 2003: 83; Sebastian, 2003; Song, 2003; The 
Economist, 2004). As a result, this generation has been 
increasingly exposed to Western economic and political 
procedures and social institutions. A significant question that 
must be asked is what impact this will have on Australia. Does 
culture in terms of international business become less important 
or less of a barrier? 
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Technology and consumption 
 
Figure 10.1. Internet users by world region 
 
Source: Internet World Stats 2007 
 
The role of technology and consumption is the third significant 
theme in a discussion about generational change in Asia. In the 
latest data on Internet usage, Asia has the highest number of 
Internet users with nearly 400 million users compared with 
Europe with 315 million and North America with 233 million 
users. Throughout Asia, more people are gaining access to the 
Internet and are buying mobile phones. This is resulting in a 
revolution in the way people (in particular younger generations) 
communicate and relate to their society, as these new 
technologies are providing a new space for interaction (Fahey 
2003; McMahon, 2004; Song, 2003). As previously discussed, 
Asian youth are very much engaged with politics (Fahey, 2003: 
83) and are now beginning to challenge issues in a new public 
sphere – cyberspace. The Internet and mobile phones (text 
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messaging) are increasingly being used to discuss social and 
political issues and even to influence elections. New 
technologies make communication between large numbers of 
people across long distances relatively easy and fast, providing 
greater freedom of information (Song, 2003). Asia’s new 
generation has been described as ‘technologically savvy’ due to 
their propensity for this new technology. Approximately two 
thirds of the South Korean population utilise the Internet, and 
across Asia in general, new jobs in digital technology are being 
created, making the ideal of lifelong employment old-fashioned. 
Fahey (2003) in her study, ‘Generational Change and 
Cyberpolitics in Asia’ provides a detailed introduction to the 
profusion of new technology in Asia and the impact this is 
having on society and politics. Fahey proposes that new 
technology, the Internet (especially chat rooms) and text 
messaging are providing a new social forum that is separate from 
both government regulation and the older generation. Younger 
generations are using new technology to express opinions, 
launch campaigns, report on events, et cetera (Fahey 2003: 105). 
Fahey sees this new public sphere are being central to 
generational change as for the first time transnational 
communication is easily accessible, thus altering the dimensions 
and structure of public space (2003: 90–91). Fahey describes the 
Internet as significant as it involves “costless reproduction, is 
decentralised, and [allows] instantaneous dissemination of 
information” and, as such, has revolutionised political activity 
throughout Asia (2003: 104). As stated above, the election of 
President Roh, exemplifies the use of new technology and 
political participation. Song argues that the Internet provides a 
‘generational voice’ for younger generations, stating that the use 
of the Internet and text messaging to assist with the election of 
Roh was aimed at ‘mobilising generational solidarity’ (2003:9). 
Internet demonstrations in South Korea were so powerful that 
they assisted with the fall of the ‘gentleman’s club’ from the 
centre of politics and society. The use of text messaging, 
‘blogging’, online campaign audio/videos are increasingly 
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becoming a norm during elections. Similarly, the Internet and 
text messaging have been used in Indonesia and China to 
challenge various points of authority and to affect political 
activity. Whether the Internet creates a new form of democracy 
in Asia remains to be seen. There have been numerous attempts 
by governments to cordon off and limit the use of the Internet 
in political mobilisation. 
The rapid infiltration and use of new technology has also 
resulted in a transformation within consumerism in Asia. This in 
itself is significant as it illustrates the impact of younger 
generations on the larger economic sphere. Younger 
generations are gaining increasingly wider access to new 
technology and as a result desire greater control over what they 
buy and the services they use. As recently reported in The Korea 
Times (2005) there is a new generation of consumers, labelled 
‘prosumers’ due to their increasing tendency to be involved in 
the consumption process. This reflects an analysis of the 
changing behaviour of young consumers in Korea, calling them 
‘generation C ers’ due to their creativity and changing 
consumption habits (The Korea Times, 2005). There is 
apparently a current shift away from passive, straightforward 
consumption within younger generations to customisation or 
even co-production of products (The Korea Times, 2005). As 
such, generation ‘C’ has ‘transformed marketing into a two-way 
conversation’ between corporations and consumers, as 
consumption becomes all about ‘you’ (The Korea Times, 2005). 
This transformation of consumerism will have an increasing 
impact on the economic sphere as newer technologies become 
available. An important question arises for Australia: how will 
this transformation affect Australia in terms of Australia’s import 
and export markets with Asia?  
While the protrusion of new technologies and the changing 
nature of consumerism have resulted in increased creativity, 
individualism and greater communication across Asia, there are 
also numerous negative implications within this facet of 
generational change. At present, access to the Internet and 
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mobile phones is not equal throughout Asia or even within 
nations, this ‘digital divide’ being cause by differences in 
‘income, age and gender’ (Fahey, 2003:97–8). Between different 
areas in China there is a formidable wealth-divide (Hill, 2003) 
resulting in certain groups being excluded from the benefits of 
new technology and social formations (McMahon, 2004). 
Similarly, there is a limited penetration of new technology within 
Southeast Asia, and as such the use of the Internet and mobile 
phone for political purposes is restricted to the urban elite 
(Fahey, 2003: 95). In Malaysia, while most youth enjoy a high 
level of affluence and tend to be ‘technologically savvy’, there is 
a large sector of rural youth whose basic needs are not being met 
(AASSREC Conference, 2003: 1). In addition, the Internet and 
mobile phones are largely inaccessible to older generations 
throughout the region, resulting in a division between younger 
and older generations. Here, Fahey acknowledges the potential 
social problems posed by the digital divide (2003: 98). If, as 
Fahey suggests, new technology (such as the Internet and mobile 
phones) becomes the major form of political engagement and 
democracy development (assuming democracy is the chosen 
path), groups excluded from access to new technologies may 
feel even further disenfranchised (2003: 98). The impact of the 
digital divide thus requires further investigation in terms of its 
social, political and economic repercussions, as well as its 
implications for Australia-Asia relations. 
Conclusion 
As a rounding off of the range of issues raised in this book on 
the impact of generational change in Australia and Korea, this 
chapter has mapped out a number of key discussions involved in 
a region in transition. It has also highlighted a number of 
research gaps in studies on the impact of generational change in 
Asia. For example, there is little to no research on how 
‘generational change’ has affected the foreign policy of Asian 
countries. More research also needs to be conducted on how 
‘generational change in Asia’ will affect Australia in terms of 
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economic, political, and cultural relations. Further, more 
empirical data needs to be developed on trends in changes in 
attitudes to political and economic relations, and social 
problems that can be used to back up current conclusions. 
Finally, there is currently a significant imbalance in the amount 
of information on China and Japan compared to any other 
country, demonstrating a great need for research to be 
conducted on the causes and consequences of generational 
change in other Asian countries. 
Within a specific context, this book examines the social policy 
challenges emerging as a result of demographic shifts taking 
place in Australia and Korea. It specifically considers some of the 
social and demographic changes in both countries with a 
particular focus on addressing their demographic make-up and 
the common challenges of decreasing fertility rates, the ageing 
population and the need for improved health care systems. It 
also addresses the issue of technology and its impact on the 
digital generation – those born between 1979 and 1994. This 
generation is the beneficiary of the economic boom of the late 
80s and 90s and has been brought up in an era of excessive 
mobile phone use and of ubiquitous, fast and cheap access to 
Internet. This book has also examined the generation 
sandwiched between ageing parents who need care and their 
own children. ‘Chewed at both ends’, they struggle to support 
ageing parents and pay for the education of their children. 
There is indeed a need to rethink child care and family support 
schemes and the traditional role of women as homemaker. 
Finally, the book addresses how society will cope with the 
changing health and financial needs of an ageing population. 
How will economies increase productivity so that shrinking 
workforces can maintain expanding pool of retirees?  
What policy changes need to be made to adjust to these 
changing demographics? 
Current debates and discussions on social policy tend to 
compare Australia with the United States and the United 
Kingdom. This book attempts to redress that imbalance by 
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offering new perspectives of Australian society through a 
comparison with South Korea, in light of the importance of the 
relationship between the two nations. There still remain a great 
number of issues related to generational change that need to be 
examined hopefully this book has made that step towards 
addressing some of them. 
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